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PREFACE 
This paper presents a revised version of Roy Rothwell's 
contribution to the IIASA Task Force Meeing on "Innovation and 
Industrial Strategy" in June 1980 .  It shows the heavy impact 
of technical change on employment both from the side of pro- 
cesses and products. Discussing the economic mechanisms of 
long waves the author mentions "...The fact that Menschs' 
inventions are rather more spread over time than his bunches 
of innovations, certainly suggests that other factors play a 
part in forcing their commercialization." Those factors are 
the self-reinforcing pressures of capital accumulation, which 
result in higher capital intensity and lower profitability 
until capital investment peaks out and begins to decline. 
Roy Rothwell comes to some conclusions for the policy to be 
applied. In his opinion governments, via market economies, 
might help to accelerate the formation of new industries 
through the process of innovative procurement in the public 
sector. 
Heinz-Dieter Zaustein, 
Innovation Task Group, 
Management and Technology, 
November, 1 9 8 0  

CONTENTS 
1 .  Introduction 
2. Shifts in Post War Patterns of Employment 
3. Theories of Manufacturing Employment/Unemployment 
4. Structural Changes in the Relationship between 
Manufacturing Output and Employment 
5. Technology asd Structural Change in the World 
Economy 
6. The Role of Technical Change in the Economic 
Crisis 
7. Policy Implications 

l ' x i ~ i o g y ,  Ztructural Change and Manufacturing Employment. 
1 . Introduction. 
Fol lowing the so-call ed energy c r i s i s  of 1974, unemployment increased 
significantly in most of. the mature industrialised market economies. Moreover, 
the recovery of the world economy from the 1974-75 recession did not lead to 
a rapid f a l l  in unemployment, which had been the pattern of a l l  previous 
post-war recoveries (Rothwell and Zegveld, 1979). On the contrary, throughout 
Europe levels  of unemployment have remained high by post-war standards, and in 
some countries rose even higher between 1976 and 1978. In the U.K. levels of 
unemployment a re  fluctuating b u t  on an apparently r is ing trend. In the United 
States,  although overall unemployment has remained higher than i n  the 1960s, 
there was nevertheless some reduction between 1976 and 1978, even though the 
labour force did increase f a i r l y  rapidly during t h i s  period. This was the r e su l t  
of act ive enployment and expansionary economic pol ic ies  through which a great  many 
new jobs were generated primarily i n  the public sector. 
&employment levels during the 1970s f o r  a number of countries are  shown i n  
Table 1. 
During the 1950s unemployment in the United States  was high re la t ive  
to Europe, and there was considerable concern in American Trade Unions about 
the effects  of automation and computerisation on 1 eve1 s of employment. Curing the 
1960s U.S. pol icy became more expansionary and U.S. growth ra tes  were s igni f i -  
cantly higher than in..the 1950s. Unemployment f e l l  and there was a widespread 
feel ing tha t  the 'automation score' had been a fa1 se alarm. I t  had proved possi bl E 
to  generate new jobs in suff icient  numbers to of fse t  any labour displacement 
involved in the adoption of new technology. I t  was t h u s  concluded in the 196Gs 
that  the unemployment problem in the USA was overwhelmingly one of demand 
rather than one of structural or technical change, and i t  is probably t rue to say 
that  today emphasis in the U.S. i s  prfmarily on the ro le  of aggregate denand. 
In Eurcpe, on the other hand, there i s  greater in teres t  in problems of 
structural ar?d technical change, and i t  i s  increasingly being suggested tha t  new 
features in the world economic s i tuat ion and in world technology mean tha t  the 
employnent problems of the 1980s will d i f f e r  s ignif icant ly from those 
encountered i n  the 1960s; tha t  the high unemployment of the 1970s cannot be 
written off as due to a period of demand efficiency - a purely temporary aberra- 
tion f r w  a steady long-term growth pattern - b u t  m u s t  be regarded a s  marking a 
transition to a rather d'fferent re1 ationship between output and mplopen t .  
Table 1. 
L i . S  (32.- 
- 
'?!ma (Pozeastog* of lab-- Lsrt.) 
This paper will present an argument for  a ' s t ruc tu ra l i s t '  irlterpre- 
tdtion of the contemporary unemploynent problem. I t  wfll argue that  whi: c? 
asgregate dunand i s  extremely Important to maintaintng mploynent, by i t s e l f  I t  
cannot explain current trends and tha t  the r a t e  and dfrect ion of technical change 
i s  one of the central issues involved. A detailed discussion of the issue of 
the relationship between technical change and mploynent i s  provided i n  
Rcthwell and Zegveld (1979). 
2. Shif ts  in Post War Patterns of Employment. 
During the post a r  era there have been a number of marked inter-  
sectoral sh i f t s  in labour in a1 1 the mature industrial ised economies, and a 
number of comnon trends are  clear ly discernible (see Figure 1 ). I t  i s  an 
establ ished f a c t  tha t  there has been a steady decl ine of employment i n  the primary 
sectors (agriculture and mining)  between 1948 and 1975. The decl ine in 
agrlcul tural employnent has, moreover, been accompanied by a marked r i s e  in 
agricultural output, and i t  i s  an important f a c t  tha t  a pattern of ' jobless g 
growth' of o u t p u t  has been well establ ished i n a major economic sector fo r  a 
long time. 
The pattern of employment change i n  manufacturing i s  n o t  so clear  cut  
or so consistent a s  i n  the primary sector. There a r e  variat ions between 
countries and there are  pecul i a r i t i e s  in the direct ion and r a t e  of change 
of mp1 oynent growth over time. Neverthel ess, one general i sation can be made, 
and tha t  i s  the r a t e  of increase in manufacturing employment had already slowed 
down markedly i n  almost a l l  mature industrialised countries well before 1973, 
which ra ises  the question of whether the phenomenon of jobless growth has 
now become esta bl ished in the secondary sector in  the advanced econmies. 
A feature common to a l l  the advanced Western economies i s  the steady 
post-war growth in employnent i n  the t e r t i a ry  sector, both public and private, 
and for  most, if not a1 1 ,  of the countries shown in Figure 1 , the t e r t i a ry  
sector now employs more than either the primary or the secondary sectors. 
Two notable character is t ics  of the t e r t i a ry  sector a re  tha t  labour productivity 
and capital intensity a re  both re la t ive ly  low. Now, while i t  i s  generally 
recognised tha t  the marked s h i f t  of employnent to the service sector i s  
related to tfie increase i n  demand for commercial and public services by consumers 
and businesses, neverthel ess, the slow growth of labour productivity in th i s  
sector contributed to th i s  sh i f t .  As Gershuny (1979) puts it: 
"One condition for  maintenance of fu l l  employnent i n  an economy 
(holding re l a t ive  wages constant) must be tha t  the total  product 
r i se s  a t  the same r a t e  as  does the manpower productivity across 
the ecunmy. Over the past two decades, throughout OECD, manpower 
productivity in manufacturing industry has r isen fa s t e r  than GNP 
(Figure 2 ) .  Employnent can only be maintained under such conditions 
by passlng labour into the re la t ive ly  low productivity, low 
productivity growth, service sector". 
Figure 1 .  Sectoral Employment i n  the Seven Econo~ies 1 
Sou~ce: J .  Cenhuny, SPRU. 
Thus, an important question t o  ask here i s  "are there developnents i n  
technology which are 1 i a b l  e to cause a dramatic increase i n  labour p roduc t i v i t y  
i n  the serv ice sector, w i t h  i t s  copsequences f o r  employment growth i n  t h i s  
sector?" The cur ren t  debate concerning microe lect ron ics  very much revolves 
around t h i s  question. This issue w i ' l l  not, however, be discussed fur ther i n  
t h i s  paper which w i l l  deal so le ly  w i t h  manufacturing equipnent. 
Figure 2 
Canada 
U.S.A. 
and GW Grouth. 1960-1976 
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3. Theories of Manufactuting L~plcynent/Unmpl oqment . 
( i  ) Aggregate dmand theory. 
Tab1 e 2 shows production and empl oynent i n  the manufacturing 
industries of 20 OECD member countries between 1973 and 1978 (Soete, 1978). 
I t  shows that,  wlth the exception of the USA, the industrial recovery from 
the 1975 depressfon has not been accmpanied i n  any of the "rich" OECD countries 
by a simflar recovery i n  emploflent. On the contrary - again w i t h  the exception 
of the USA - in a1 1 the r ich OECD countries employment has declined during 
the 1975-78 period, despite some growth in industrfal output. These figures 
question the abil i t y  of the Western economies to solve t h e i r  employment 
probl ens using purely neo-classfcal or Keynsian demand stimulation measures. 
Figure 3 plots industrial  output and employment i n  the nlne 
EEC member countries during the period 1950-78. I t  shows three very d i s t inc t  
periods in the relationship between output and employment (Soete, 1978): 
- the period 1950-1965, which i s  characterised by high growth i n  industrial o u t -  
p u t  (7% annual average r a t e )  accompanied by an important creation of employment 
(1% annual average growth r a t e ) ;  
- the period 1965-1 973, which i s  characterised by high growth in industrial . .-. 
cutput (6% annual average r a t e )  and empl oyment stagnation; 
- the period 1973-1978, characterised by low and stagnant growth in . 
industrial o u t p u t  (1% annual averate r a t e )  accompanied by "deployment" ( -  1.8% . 
annual average r a t e )  . 
Between 1950 and IS78 the relationship between output and 
empl oyment has c lear ly  a1 tered. Underlying structural change in th i s  
r e l a t i ~ n s h i p  appears to have become established during the mid to l a t e  
1960's. and has intensified following the so-called energy c r i s i s  of 1974. 
Thus,  wh?le the aggregate demand theory of industrial employment would appear 
to have been valid between 1950 and 1965, i t s  va l id i ty  for  the period 1965- 
1978 I s  highly questionable, a t  l eas t  for  the nine members of the EEC. Under 
these circumstances demand stimulation measures aimed a t  generating employment 
through growth i n  industrial o u t p u t  would seem to stand l i t t l e  chance o? more 
than only 1 imited success. This is n o t  to suggest tha t  levels of aggregate 
dmand are  unimportant, but rather that  prescriptions and explanations 
couched solel in t e n s  of aggregate demand' a re  insufficient.  What Tabi e 2 
and Figure + ao suggest i s  .,hat the pheficmenon of jobless growth i s  now 
firmly establ i s M  in the manufacturing sector- of a number of advanced 
Western economi es. 
B u t  what about the situation in the USA, where industrial 
mpl oyment did increase consistently between 1975 and 1978 as industrial 
output increased? The answer might l i e ,  a t  l eas t  in part, in differences 
in the structure of U.S. industry compared to  industries in Western Euroce. 
A recent report comissfoned by the Anglo Geman Foundation 
showed that  new technology based firms have played a major role  in the U.S. 
economy, w h i r t h e i r  ro le  i n  the U .K. and West Germany has been on1 y small 
(A.D.  L i t t l e  Ltd., 1977). (There a re  several thousand NTBFs i n  the U.S. 
employing in excess of two mil 1 ion. In the Silicon Valley area alone, in 
1974 there were 800 NTBFs w i t h  annual sales  of 92.5 b i l l  ion. In the U . K .  
the number of NTBFs currently in existence i s  only about 200 with total  sales 
of 5200 mill ion. In West Germany the number of NTBFs i s  even l e s s . )  
A1 though the regenerative capacity of small and medium-sized firms i n  Ebrope 
may be higher than i n  the U.S.A. Trade S ta t i s t i c s  also show tha t  U.S. Exports 
are more technolcgy intensive than those from other major OECD exporters 
(Kelly, 1978). Now, i t  I s  well-known tha t  the U.S. led the world in the 
production of smiconductors and semiconductor devices. A similar 
pattern I s  being establ lshed In the production of microelectronic cfrcui ts  
and devices. In both instances, i n i t i a l l y  m a l l ,  but f a s t  growing high tech- 
nology firms played a major ro le  in the production of these new technologies 
and devlces. I t  might, therefore, be tha t  the recent developnent of 
microelectronics in the U.S. has played an Important ro le  i n  the generation of 
new jobs via the creation of many new, f a s t  growing high technology firms. 
(Between 1963 and 1973, the growth of the U.S. seniconductor industry was f ive  
times tha t  of the U.S. GNP; growth of the integrated c i r c u i t  segment was 
about 80 tlmes that  of the U.S. GNP). 
The resul t s  of a recent study by the U.S. Department of Comerce 
would appear to lend some support t o  this "new mal l  firm" argument (1978). 
The study looked a t  s ix "mature" corporations (including General Motors and 
Bethlehem Steel) ,  f ive  "innovative" companies (including Polarold and IBM) and . 
f ive  young "high technology" firms (such as  Marion Labs; and Digital Equlpnent). 
The mature firms, which had combined annual sales of $36 b i l l  i.m, added only 
25,000 workers between 1973 and 1978; the innovative companies, w i t h  combined 
annual sales  of $21 bill1 Ion, added 106,000 workers; the high technology 
companies, w i t h  total  sales of 857 mill ion, created 35,000 new jobs. In terms 
of workers created/Smill ion of turnover, this yields the figures: mature 
corporations 0.7, innovative companies 5, young high technology companies 41 . 
In the "50's" and "60's" the semiconductor and computer hardware industries 
were generating a l o t  of new employnent. In the "70's" the main growth in * 
employment has not derived from the hardware side, b u t  from the software side, 
e.g. computer bureaux, infomation services, where small new firms have 
pro1 i f  era ted .* 
In contrast  to the U.S., semiconductors in Europe were developed 
and exploited by existing large electronics firms. I t  seems re~sonable to 
suppose tha t  a similar pattern i s  occurring with the development and 
exploitation of microelectronics. T h i s  could mean that  whil e the information 
technology has generated many new jobs In the U.S., t h i s  may not be true in 
Europe. 
Thug, i t  might be that  in an economy whose industry i s  charac- 
terised t o  a significant extent by the rapid growth of many new firms 
based o n  the mergence of new technological opportunities, there la t ionship  
between o u t p u t  and employnent i s  positive. In an economy based more o n  mature 
industries and i n  which existin large firms largely exploit the same new 
techno1 ogles, the re la t ionsn~p-  T%etween o u t p u t  and employment i s  much weaker, 
According t o  the international division of 1 abour theory, 
structural unemployment in the advanced economies i s  due primarily t o  sh i f t s  
in stagnant, 1 abour-intensive industries from high labour cost  developed 
countries t o  l e s s  developed countries where labour costs a re  much lower. A t  
the same time labour in the developed world sh i f t s  t o  capital-intensive 
sectors having potential for growth. The final resul t  of th i s  process i s  one 
of national special isation in re la t ive  factor abundant industries or prcducts, 
and a l l  countries end u p  being better o f f .  According to th i s  interpretation, 
unemploynent in the developed world i s  only temporary and i s  due more often to 
past unwill ingness to  adjust under trade 1 i beralisation. 
* The ro le  of mall  firms i n  @nploflent i s  discussed l a t e r  in th i s  chapter. 
I 
If a significant percentage of enploynent i n  the labour- 
intensive industries in the Western economies has moved to the l e s s  
developed, low wage cost countries (LDCs), then th i s  m i g h t  be expected 
t o  be reflected i n  a s ignif icant  level of imports from LDCs to the 
developed nations. Further, i f  this factor has grown i n  importance, 
and i s  making a major contribution to recent high levels of unemployment, 
then the percentage of imports from the LDCs would be expected to  be 
significantly higher today, than, say, twenty or  so years ago. Thus, by 
separati ng imports originating from LDCs from those originating from 
the advanced economies, i t  should be possible to separate international 
canpetition based largely on comparative advantage (i  .e. 1 ow wage 
competi t ion) and competition based -1aweiy on non-pFfa-fattors t i .e.  
technical change). 
Soete (1978) has produced data which show tha t  international 
competi tion from developed countries i s  a more significant factor  of 
domestfc consumption - 4.31% (1959-1960) to  7.35% (1973-74) - than 
international competftion from UCs ( less  than 2% of domestic consumption i n  
the Western World) . Further, the evolution over time indicates that  
developed country competition has grown more rapidly than low-wage 
competftion. Other data broken down fo r  11 broad industry groups showed that: 
-in most industries foreign penetration of Western dcmestic markets i s  
re lat ively high, and i n  the f irst  place the r e su l t  of competition from 
developed countries; 
8 
-in terms of "low mge" competition, market penetration Is  weak i n  ai 1 
industrial sectors, except i n Clothing, Petrol eum products and Fery-us 
and Non-ferrous metal products (two na t u r ~ l  resource intensive i ndustzes  ) . 
Only in the Food industry, Textiles b u t  also Chemicals, LDCs imports 
represent more than 1% of domestic apparent consumption. 
-in terms of growth, import competition has increassd i n  a l l  industrizl 
sectors, especially in Clothiqg (mainly low-wage competition), b u t  also 
i n  Textil es, Rubber, Transport Equipment and Machinery; 
The natural conclusion to draw from these figures i s  that,  
contrary to "pure" trade theory, and the concept of the in t e rna t io~a l  
division of labour, low-wage cost foreign competition has, direct ly ,  played 
only a minor role i n  the structural employnent c r i s i s  in the Western economies. 
However, i t  m i g h t  be that  competftion from low wage cost countries has 
accelerated the scrapping cf old vintages, and also resulted in some product 
and process innovation, thereby. having an indirect e f fec t  on structural change. 
i i i l  Technical Change Theory. I,, ,, ,,, , , ,,, , ,,, ,,- , , , ,
There a re  two aspects to the technical change theory of 
unemplogent. In the f i r s t  plzce, jobs can be los t  because of lack of 
competitiveness in the face of technically advanced imports. In the second 
place, j o b s  are  lo s t  through rationalisation by the home industry in 
attempting t o  Increase i t s  production efficiency to  match that  i n  major 
competitor countries, as we1 1 as attempting to overcome the price advantage 
enjoyed by traditional ~ o o d s  produced i n  the LDCs. 
I n  order to provide a rigorous verification of the importance 
of technical change on the export performance in manufactured gcods of OECD 
member countries (Iceland and New Zealand being excluded), Soete investigated 
the relationship betdeen gatents granted to those countries by the US patents 
office between 1963 and 1976 i n  40 industrial sectors w i t h ,  for  these same 
countries, :he 1974 exports of  the 40 industries. I t  was assumed i n  t n i s  
analysis that the United States i s  the leading inventive ac t iv i ty  country 
and market, and wil l  t h u s  a t t r ac t  most of the important patents from other 
OECD countries. The resul t s  of th is  analysis are: 
- for  most capital goods industries, significant resul ts  are obtained; 
- for  most consumer goods ( jus t  as intermediate goods and materials where 
technical change i s  weak) where technical change i s  more based o n  the 
diffusion of innovations t h a t  have occurred in the capital  goods sector, non-sig. 
nificant resul t s  were obtained. 
In interpreting his resul ts, Soete assumed tha t  most technical 
change i n  capital goods is of the cost-reducing, continuous type. He therefore 
concluded that  while technical change per se  i s  important to competitiveness, 
cost-reducing technical change i n  ,particular i s  the crucial factor i n  in ter -  
national competition i n  capital goods; as a resul t ,  i n  the Western economies 
between 1963 and 1976, competition mainly from other developed countries has 
been the crucial factor  i n  inducing industries into, i n  the f i i s s t  instance, job-displacing, labour-saving technical change. 
While much technical change i s  undoubtedly of the cost-reduction 
type, nevertheless a number of detailed studies of specific industry sectors, 
have highlighted the importance of "product performance" technical change i n  
international competitiveness. Exampl es are  agrfcul tural machinery (RothweJ 1, 
1979) and Portable Power Tools (Wal ker, 1978). Several studies have a1 so 
emphasised th i s  aspect of competitiveness over a wide range of industrial 
products (NEDO, 1977, Corf ield,  1979). Two studies of machine building industrie 
have explici t ly  linked job loss  i n  the U.K.  to lack of performance-orientated 
technical change. The f i r s t  of these (Rothwell , 1980) showed that  dur ing  the 
post-war period the position of the U.K.textile machinery industry has been 
one of decline and tha t  t h i s  decline was primarily the r e su l t  of the fa i lure  
o f  many U . K .  firms to undertake programmes of technical development. As a 
resul t  the U.K. ' s  share of world trade i n  t ex t i l e  machinery declined from 
30% i n  1954 to 11% i n  1975. A t  the same tine,  employment i n  the industry 
dropped from 75,000 in 1951 to 35,000 i n  1973. This f a l l  i n  level of employ- 
ment was the resul t  mainly of loss  of market share due to a decline i n  
"product performance" international competitiveness rather than the rational i- 
sation of manufacturing processes. According to the second of these studies (Swords-Isherwood and Senker, 1978): 
"There has  bee^ a trend, towards reductio,n i n  mployment in the 
British engineering industry. Automation has played some part in 
causing this. B u t  i s  has been the resul t to a greater extent of the 
fa i lure  of British management to invest suff icient ly in research 
and developent and production fac i l  i t i e s  to make products which 
would be more competitive on international markets. If managment 
in the British engineering industry f a i l s  to remedy these 
deficiencies, the consequences in terns of job loss could be 
considerable because of the impact of overseas competition. 
If  the industry does modernise, th i s  could resul t  in pressure to coo 
tinue to reduce job opportunities. B u t  the industry would be 
creating resources which collective bargaining can ensure are  used 
to a l lev ia te  these effects by securing benefits such as shorter 
working weeks and better working conditions." 
So, there exists eivdence to suggest that both rational isation 
and international competitiveness technica 1 change have resul tod i n  the loss 
o f  significant numbers o f  jobs i n  some Western econornles especially, i n  the 
case of the U.K., the l a t t e r .  Now, while steps can be taken to reverse 
lack of international competi tiveness through vigorous programmes of 
product developnent, jobs l o s t  through rational isation can only be 
recouped via the growth of new businesses or through signif icant  business 
expansion. The recent developnent of microprocessor control 1 ed production systems 
however, makes I t  l ike ly  tha t  many firms can significantly expand output w i t h  
the same, or even reduced, manpower, which would place the burden of new job creatlon on the growth of new manufacturing firms and on the service sector 
of the economy. 
Finally, Cox (1978) has looked i n  some detail  a t  the 
relationship between empl ojaent costs, sal es receipts and rational i sation 
and has presented extremely convincing data from the United Kingdom and 
West German mechanical engineering industries to show tha t  where there is 
a mismatch between sales receipts and employment costs, firms shed labour and 
ratlonal lsation invesatment replaces growth or rep1 acement investment. The 
process of employnent loss  through wage cost inf lat ion is  i l lus t ra ted  i n  
Table 3. 
Table 3. The relationship between costs per employee, sales and employment 
in the U.K. and West German mechanical engineering industries. -
\ 
Percentage increase per year Actual change 
Costs per employee - Sal es i n empl oynent 
X (* 10 
UNITED KINGDOM 
1958 to  1 963 
1963 to 7967 
1967 to 1 971 
1971 to 1975 
WEST GERMANY 
i 9 6 7 t o  i a71 
1971 to 1975 
Cox concludes: 
' I . . .  . i n  current o u t p u t  technologiczl developnent i s  responsible for  maintzining 
and increasing sales and, potentially, the numbers employed. I f  however unions 
negociate an average cost peI- employee tha t  i s  cut  of l ine  w i t h  increase in 
sales receipts, then technical development comes to  play an additional role  - 
tha t  of substituting machine effort  for  human effort ,  which has become too 
expensive." Thus, wage- and social securi ty-push have reduced employment and 
favoured rational isation i nvestnent. 
The above 'explanations are  not, of course, m u l a l l y  exclusive 
and can a c t  concurrently to reduce 1 eve1 s of employment i n  the advanced 
economies. This i s  i l lus t ra ted  i n  Table 4 fo r  the U.K., which shows the reasons 
for  jobs l o s t  in the 24 ifadustries most affected by U.K. competition between 
1970 and 1975. I t  can be seen tha t  12.3% of jobs 10s;: were due to  fa1 1 in5 demand 
a t  home (aggregate denand) 50% were due to r ls ing productivity a t  home 
(rational isation technical change), 26% because of trade wi t h  non-third world 
countries (technical change competitiveness) and 9% a s  a r e s u l t  of trade with 
t h i r d  world countries   lo:^ cost  competitiveness). In the area of t ex t i l e s ,  
i n  which t h i r d  world countries probably enjoy the i r  greatest  success in trade 
i n  manufactured goods, only 25% of U .K. imports derived from these countrles. 
This suggests t h a t  current demands fo r  s t r ingent  controls on U . K .  t e x t i l e  
imports from the LDC's a r e  largely mis-directed. 
Table 4 Reasons f o r  jobs l o s t  i n  24 industr ies  most affected by Third World 
competition i n  the  U . K .  between 1970 and 1975. 
Reasons Number Percentage 
Fall ing home demand 
Rising productivity a t  home 
Trade w l  th non-thi rd world counties 
Trade w i t h  t h i rd  world countries 47,800 9.0 
- 
428,300 10.0 
Source: Sunday Times, 10th February 1980 
4. Structural  Changes i n  t he  Relationship Between Manufacturing O u t p u t  and 
Employment 
Figure 3 presented. data which s t rongly suggest t h a t ,  w i t h i n  the  n i n e  
countries of the E.E.C. , the re1 ationship between manufacturing output and 
manufacturing employment has undergone a number of marked s t ruc tura l  chqnges 
during the  post-war era .  Figure 4 presents s imi la r  data f o r  three  E.E.C. 
'countries separate ly ,  and f o r  Japan and the U.S. (Mensch 1979) .* I t  shows 
t h a t  the  general pattern indicated in  Figure 3 generally holds t rue  f o r  the  f ive  
countrl es separately - a1 though f3ere a r e  obvious d l  fferences of detai  1 and t iming 
- which suggests t h a t  the  phenomenon of s t ruc tura l  change i n  the  output/employment 
re1 ationshi p is comnon t o  a1 1 the major advanced market economics . 
In i nterpre t i  nq these resul ts , Mensch points t o  changing patterns of 
investment i n  industry (Mensch, 1980) .Util izing data from West Germany, he has 
shown t h a t  the re la t ionship between expansi onary investment (E) and ra t ional  i sat ion 
investment (R) has a1 te red  during the post  war era .  During the  1950's and 
ear ly  19601s, investment aimed a t  expansion was su f f l c i en t ly  high i n  re la t ion  to  
t h a t  aimed towards ra t iona l iza t ion  t h a t  job generation was grea te r  than job 
displacement. In the  mid-1960's t h e  productivity e f f ec t s  p f  r ~ t i o n a l i  zation 
investment began t o  dominate and increased indus t r ia l  output could be a t ta ined w i t h  
no increase i n  employment. A period of jobless growth was thus established.  From 
the beginning o fthe 1970's ra t ional izat ion investment e f fec t s  swamped expansionary 
- ~~ - - 
* Mensch has, for convenience, subst i tu ted impu t  data ( cap i t a l )  f o r  output in  these 
f igures .  He found a consis tent ly  hlgh correla t ion (be t te r  than 90%) between the  
two quant i t i es  . 
investment e f fec ts ,  and increased output was achieved w i t h  a reduced labour force. 
The pattern of change i n  the E / R  r a t io  f o r  West German industry is shown i n  Figure 
5, which indicates tha t  from the l a t e  1960's on E/R dropped rapidly and reached a 
f a i r l y  s table  'low1 i n  about 1975/76. 
On the basis of these data,  Mensch suggests a 'threshold theory' f o r  the 
structural changes i n  the output/employment relationship. Thus,  when E/R f e l l  t o  
a part icular  level (Mensch calculates this a t  approxlmately 0.5 f o r  West Germany - 
point C o n  Figure 3) the output/employmnt relationship switched from a net 'job- 
expansion' phase into an 'employment neutral ' phase i n  which i t  continued until 
E/R reached a second threshold (approxlmately 0.25 - point on Figure 3) when 
labour substitution ef fec ts  became dominent. E/R then f e l l  to a f a i r l y  s table  
value (approximately 0.23) when a l ower 1 eve1 'underemployment' equi 1 ibri um was 
reached*. According t o  Mensdr , only when E/R increases to  a cer t?in threshold 
(point y o n  Figure 3 ) ,  the value of whlch is unspecified, will  employment i n  
manuf acturi  ng once agaf n i ncrease as output increases . 
I t  is interest ing t o  compare Figure S with the West German data in 
I 
Figure 4. As E/R dropped rapidly i n  1965, so d i d  employment; when E / R  increased 
rapidly a f t e r  1967,so employment increased also. In t h i s  case, however, the f a l l  
in  E/R was the resul t  of a rapid cutback i n  ' E '  - associated with government 
actfon d,urlng a perlod of relat ively high inf la t ion  i n  West Germany - rather than 
witha large and sudden, increase i n  'R'*. Indeed, as Figure 4 indicates,  between 
1965 and 1967, West German industrial  output remained more o r  less  constant, and 
even declined s l ight ly  i n  1967. Similarly, the rapid f a l l  i n  E/R between 1973 and 
1975 was the resul t  of ' E l  declining rather than ' R '  increasing significantly**. 
Clark (1979) has investigated the re1 ationship between annual changes i n  
manufacturing employment and annual investment i n  U. K. manufacturing. He found 
tha t  the r a t i o  DE/I , which is the annual change of employment per u n i t  of investment 
has varfed i n  a cyclical manner durfng the past 60 years or  so. Clark interprets  
these data (see figure 6)  as suggestlng tha t  changes i n  the relattonship between 
expansionary investment and rationalization investment vary i n  a cyclical manner 
also. 
Mensch investment data are  based on an IF0 survey of 6,000 West Germany 
manufacturf ng compand es only. Given the d i f f i cu l t i e s  i n  accurately specifying 
the an3unt of investment aimed purly a t  expansion and tha t  aimed purely a t  
rational ization, the val idi ty of quantifytng the ' t u r n i n g  points ' must be 
seriously questioned. Nevertheless, the concept is an interest ing one. 
++ 
Between 1965 and 1967 ' R 1  remained more or less  constant, whi l e  'E' f e l l  by 
nearly 40%. 
- Between 1973 and 1975, ' R '  remained almost constant, while ' E l  f e l l  by about 50%. 
F a r  All=tion in U.S. Slunrfmring 1ndwa-y 1953-1 975. 
. 
FIG. 4 .  Investment and Employment in West Germany, Netherlands, 
United Kingdom, Japan and the U . S . A . ,  1950-1975 
- 
Source: Mensch 1979 
I 
Faczar c\:lccaP;on in W u t  Germam In&-* 193-1917. 
0--------0 S from o f f i c i a l  s t a t i s t i c s  
----... estimates: S=bE/R 
S = number o f  'open' position i n  industry 
E = Expansfonary fnvestment 
R = Rational izat ion investment 
FIGURE 5 
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Source: Mensch et a1, 1980. 
Fig, 6 Employment change per unit  o f  investment Carnoothed), UR manufacturing. 
SOURCE: CLARK 1979 
Before discussing the role technical change plays in causing these 
structural changes, a brief description will be given of the theory of long-  
waves in world economic developnent and their rela tionship to technical 
change. According t o  this  theory, the world i s  currently i n  the l a t t e r  phases 
of the fourth industrial revolution. 
5. Technology and Structural Change in the World Economy. 
While i t  i s  generally accepted that  the shock to the world economy of the 
fourfold increase in the price of OPEC oil  in 1974 contributed t o  the current 
world recession, i t  i s  increasingly being mooted tha t  t h i s  simply accelerated a n  
already established trend; tha t  the current world economic c r i s i s  i s  the 
resul t  of fundamental structural changes taking place in the world economy 
in which technical change plays a central role;  tha t  the fourth quarter of the 
twentieth century will be rather more similar t o  the second rather t h a n  
to the third quarter of th i s  century. 
These conjectures have led t o  a resurgence of in teres t  in the possi bi 1 i t y  
of long waves occurring i n  the development of the world economy. Probably 
the ea r l i e s t  detailed formulation of long-wave theory was tha t  of a Russian 
economist Kondratiev who, i n  the 1920s, anal ysed the developnent of long-term 
trends in selected economic indicators. He discovered a number of long waves 
in the world economy of between 50 and 60 years duration. While Kondratiev 
d i d  n o t  expl i c i t l y  include the role  of technical change in long-wave formation, 
he did suggest tha t  when a major wave of expansion was under way, inventions 
that  had remained eormant would find appl ication. 
The notion ~f long waves was l a t e r  taken u p  by Schumpeter (1939), who 
ascribed a central role  t o  technical change in 1 ong-wave formation. He 
introduced the idea of technological revolutions as the driving force of 
the Kondratiev cycles, and pointed in particular to  the role  of steam power 
in the f i r s t  Kondratiev (1818-1842), railroads in the second (1843-1897) and 
of e lec t r ic  power ard the autornboile in the third (1898 t o  about 1949) .* 
Schumpeter related these major changes primarily t o  bursts of innovative 
ac t iv i ty  by entrepreneurs. 
* The period of prosperity associated with the fourth Kondratiev i s  
approximately 1949-1 968. 
Kuznets(1.554) l a t e r  pointed o u t  t h a t  t he re  appears t o  be no specia l  
reason to expect t h a t  t he  i n t e n s i t y  o f  en t repreneur ia l  i nnova t i ve  a c t i v i t y  
w i l l  va ry  i n  long cyc les ,  a1 though he d i d  accept  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a  bunching 
o f  innovat ions associated w i t h  new technologies and o f  investment a c t i v i t i e s  
associated w i t h  these bunches of i nnovations. Such innovat ions  would need 
t o  be such, however, t h a t  t h e i r  e f fec ts  would permeate throughout  t he  econ~mic  
system and be f a r  reaching.  
Freeman (1 97s) w h i l e  b a s i c a l l y  support ing the  Schunpeter ian i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  
has pointed t o  a  number o f  snags - f o r  example t o  the  ve ry  d i f f e r e n t  development 
i n  t ime o f  t h e  automobi le i n d u s t r i e s  i n  America, Europe and Japan. He a l s o  po in ted  
t o  the  need f o r  'bas ic  sc ience'  coup1 ed t o  ' t echn ica l  expl o i t a t i o n '  f o l  lowed 
by ' imag ina t i ve  1  eaps' - a1 1  preceding t h e  Kondrat iev upswing. As Ray (1980) 
pu ts  it: 
"Schumpeter himself emphasised the  v iew t h a t  w h i l s t  t h e r e  - i s a  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between innova t i on  and economic development, i t  i s  a  ve ry  complex 
one. One innova t i on  i s  f o l l owed  by another and t h e  long cha in  e v e n t u a l l y  produces 
new products o r  processes which a r e  again f u r t h e r  developed and/or rep laced.  
If the  new product  o r  process i s  impor tan t  enough, i t  generates a c t i v i t y  
i n  many a1 l i e d  areas and cascades through t h e  whole f a b r i c  o f  economic and 
soc ia l  l i f e . "  
Work on long-wave format ion to-day f a l l s  b a s i c a l l y  i n t o  two camps, the  
f i r s t  emphasisi ng f a c t o r s  of demand, the  second emphasi sing f a c t o r s  o f  supply. 
It i s  probably t r u e  t o  say t h a t  researchers i n  t he  U.S. g e n e r a l l y  f a l l  i n t o  the  
former category and a r e  l ook ing  a t  i n d i c a t o r s  of aggregate demand, no tab l y  
demand f o r  c a p i t a l  goods, wh i l e  workers i n  Europe a r e  focussing l a r g e l y  on the  
- - - -  
supply side, i .e. on the  r o l e  o f  i nnova t i ve  push. 
Perhaps the  most r i g o r o u s  work i n  the  U.S. i s  beinq done by the  
Systems Dynamics Group a t  M.I.T. and Graham ar,d Senge (1979) have sumar ised 
the  N.I.T. hypothesis o f  long-wave behaviour as fo l l ows :  
" Economies move through long waves o f  approximate ly  50 years 
dura t ion ,  a r i s i n g  from over-  and underexpansion of the  
c a p i t a l  -prcduci r,g sec tor .  
The upturn  o f  a  long wave, which l a s t s  about 30 years, i s  
charac t e r i  sed by s e l f  - r e i  n fo rc ing  pressures t o  acqu i re  more 
-21 - 
physical  c a p i t a l  t o  meet r i s i n g  dmand f o r  c a p i t a l ,  increase 
c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i t y  o f  product ion,  and t o  take advantage of 
h igh  r e t u r n s  on investment. 
P r o d u c t i v i t y  per man increases dur ing  t h e  upswing of t he  long wave, 
due a t  l e a s t  i n  p a r t  t o  increas ing  physical  c a p i t a l  per person. 
When the  accumulat ion o f  physical  c a p i t a l  has r u n  i t s  course, adding 
more c a p i t a l  i s  no longer more a t t r a c t i v e  than adding labour .  
Cap i ta l  investment peaks o u t  and shows s igns o f  dec l i n ing ,  and t h e  
economy en te rs  t h e  peak pe r iod  of the  long wave, which can l a s t  f o r  a  
decade o r  so. 
Cap i ta l  investment even tua l l y  fa1  1  s  o f f  d ramat i ca l l y ;  t h e  economy 
needs much l e s s  new inves.tment t o  rep lace  d e p r e c i a t i o n  than i t  d i d  
t o  expand i t s  c a p i t a l  p l a n t .  The cap i ta l -p roduc ing  i n d u s t r i e s  
co l l apse  and many of the  people i n  them become unemployed. 
During the  depression, phys ica l  c a p i t a l  begins t o  d e t e r i o r a t e  
and obsolesce. Eventual ly ,  t he re  i s  a  need t o  rep lace  it, and 
demand f o r  c a p i t a l  r i s e s .  Again the  process of c a p i t a l  accumulat ion 
i s  begun i n  the  upswing of t he  nex t  long wave." 
Thus, t h e  MIT researchers focus ve ry  c l e a r l y  on the  r o l e  of dmand 
f o r  physical  c a p i t a l  i n  t h e  fo rmat ion  o f  long-waves. The work t h a t  emphasizes 
most s t r o n g l y  the  r o l e  o f  technology-push i s  t h a t  o f  Mensch i n  West 
Germany, who t a l  ks about a  push o f  basic innovat ions opening up new investment 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s  and p rov id ing  the basis  f o r  t he  growth of who1 e  new i n d u s t r i e s .  
According t o  Mensch the re  are,  over the  past 200 years o r  so, d i s t i n c t  per iods  
- First Half of 19Ih Century . 
.- 
Second Hclf of, 19'~ Century 
ID- 
- 
First H a l f  of 2oth Century 
- 
t. 
6 
- 
4- 
- 
2- 
I 
Figure 7 Frequency of Basic lnventions and Basic Innc1~ations 
Source: Mensch 19-74 p. 146-f4'8 
~mrnc( 
t 
I J 
I i 1 I I I 
n d m  - a o  ' 1 a m i 2 o  rb sb ao ' i s m  
i n  h i s t o r y  which un ique l y  favour basic  innovat ions .  H i s  da ta  a r e  shown i n  
F igu re  7 which p l o t s  the  frequency of bas ic  innovat ions ,  and t h e  i nven r ions  
which preceded them, as a  t ime ser ies .  It i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  t h a t  Mensch's i n n o v a t i o n  
peaks preceed the  Kondrat iev depressions by about 20 years, which suggests 
t h a t  t he  seeds o f  t he  new upswing were a l ready  being sown du r i ng  the  prev ious 
downswing . 
Graham and Senge have taken up Mensch's da ta  and suggest t h a t  t h e i r  
long-wave accumulat ion of phys ica l  c a p i t a l  a f fec ts  t he  process of i nnova t i on  
as f o l l o w s :  
" Eventua l l y ,  d u r i n g  an upswing and a t  t h e  peak of a  long  wave, t h e  
economy's phys ica l  , technol  og i ca l  and managerial i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  i s  
c o m i  t t e d  t o  01 de r  technologies.  There a r e  numerous o p p o r t u n i t i e s  
f o r  improvement innovat ions ,  and l a r g e  markets f o r  then. L i t t l e  if 
any of t h e  c u r r e n t  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  i s  a b l e  t o  suppor t  bas ic  innovat ions ,  
and t h e r e  a re  few economic i n c e n t i v e s  t o  t u r n  away from t h e  es tab l  ished 
techno log ies .  
During t h e  downturn o f  t h e  long  wave, v e r y  1  i ttl e new investment 
occurs, and t h e r e  i s  1  i ttl e market  f o r  t echno log i ca l  innovat ions .  
During the  l a t e  upswing, peak, downturn, and trough, s c i e n t i f i c  
and techn i ca l  progress cont inues,  even though most of t h e  basic  
i nven t i ons  do n o t  y e t  become ccnmercial  i s &  bas ic  innovat ions .  
As a  long-wave downturn g i ves  way t o  a  new upswing, o l d  c a p i t a l  
p l a n t  has deprec iated,  so subs tan t i a l  amounts of new investment need 
t o  be made. Th i s  economic c l i m a t e  permi ts  i n v e s t o r s  t o  develop the  
new technol og ies  t h a t  may have gone untapped f o r  decades. 
The c l u s t e r  of bas ic  innovat ions  near t he  t rough and i n  the  eav l y  
upswing o f  a  long  wave moulds the  techno log i ca l  cha rac te r  cf l a t e r  
investments, and t h e  c y c l e  o f  bas ic  innovat ions  repeats  i t s e l f  ." 
Thus, t he  boom crea ted  by t h e  r a p i d  re-equipment by i n d u s t r y  i n  t u r n  
c rea tes  the  r i g h t  c l i m a t e  f o r  t he  e x p l o i t a t i o n  of dormant bas ic  i nnova t i ons  which 
r e s u l t s  i n  the  growth of new i n d u s t r i e s ,  w i t h  subsequent f u r t h e r  increases i n  
demand f o r  phys i ca l  c z p i t a l  , o f t e n  o f  a  new k ind .  The f a c t  t h a t  Mensch's 
i nven t i ons  a r e  r a t h e r  more spread over  t ime than h i s  'bunches' o f  innovat ions  
c e r t a i n l y  suggests t h a t  o t h e r  f a c t o r s  p l a y  a  p a r t  i n  f o r c i n g  t h e i r  
comercial isation. A re1 ativel y rapid increase in the r a t e  of expenditure 
on capital goods would certainly contribute towards creating a climate of 
confidence and optimi sm fo r  entreprneurs t o  operate in ,  b u t  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  
see how t h i s  would have had a suff icient ly large impact t o ,  fo r  example, 
have caused the railway boom in the 1J.K. in the mid-nineteenth century. 
Railways were developed in Britai n a t  a time when she enjoyed a very 
large share of wet-ld trade and was opening u p  new and captive markets in the 
countries of an expanding Empire. Industrialisation was proceeding apace, 
and much wealth was being generated. There was a pressing and growing need 
for  an ef f ic ient  and rapid transport system to  carry raw materials from 
various parts of the country and. from the sea ports to  the centres of production, 
and back t o  the ports as finished goods. The need for  rapid personal mobility 
of businessmen was a1 so growing. The basic innovations necessary for  the 
development of the railways ( the  steam engine, Stephenson's f i r s t  loccmotive 
i n  1814) were in being. Cheap and mobile labour was available in Ireland in 
large quantit ies.  There was thus a 'confluence' of factors  - technological, 
economic, sociological and demographic - which, together, formed the basis of 
the second Kondratiev. 
Similarly, the economic and pol i t ical  s i tuat ion i n  Europe during the 
1930s and i n  particular the 1939-1945 war, forced the rapid transformation 
of sc ient i f ic  and technolagical knowledge and inventions into practicai 
innovations and spawned the modern industries - synthetic materials, petro- 
chemicals, pharmaceuticals, composite material s and electronics - d u r i n g  a 
re7 at ively short period. This involved massive capital expenditure, mai niy 
on the part of goverments, and the concentration of sc ient i f ic  and technical 
manpower resources. The bunching of new industries formed the basis of the 
fourth Kondratiev. Again, the influence of a number of factors ,  - including, 
centrally,  new technological capabil i t ies  - was necessary before the economic 
upswing could take place. 
Thus, i t  seems tha t  while technology has played a central ro le  i n  
forcing the world economy o u t  of i t s  major periods of recession, i t  needs 
t o  be coupled w i t h  a great: and widely diffused need(s) the avai labi l i ty  c f  
large volumes of capital - along w i t h  favourable social and pol i t ical  conditions - 
before commercial i sa t ior  and rapid business development cccurs on a sufficient12 
large scale. 
If t h i s  Schumpeterian mole1 of ~ o r l d  economic development i s  indeed 
valid,  and i f  the wrld  economy i s  in a Kondratiev recession/depression ~ h a s e ,  
then th i s  clearly has implications for both goverrment and innovation policies. 
6. The Role of Technical Change i n  the Economic Cris is .  
The question t o  ask now i s ,  what ro le  does technical change play i n  
creating the structural c r i s i s  that  resul ts  f i r s t  in recession and then 
in depression? In order to  attempt to provide an answer to t h i s  question, i t  i s  
necessary to look a t  the nature, rather than the r a t e  of technical change 
i n  existing industries,  a s  well as  a t  changing patterns of investment and ra tes  
of growth i n  demand! I t  has been suggested, notably by Utterback and Abernathy, 
(1 975), that as industries mature, the underlying nature of innovation changes 
essent ial ly  form a focus on new product development, to one of process opt~ma I i sa-  
t ion and cost reduction *. . A t  the same time productivity in-reases 
dramatically and, i n  the f inal  stages of maturity, increased automaticity 
resul t s  i n  some urmeploynent. Parallel w i t h  these changes in technology, the 
pattern of investment changes from a net 'expansionary' mode into a net 
' rational isat ion '  mode. 
a 
Mai e r  and $stein (1 980) have a1 so dl scussed the way i n  wh I ch 
industries change s tructural ly over time. They have extended Utterbach's work 
and developed a f i ve-stage made1 of this ageing process (Figure 7) .  According 
to  th is  model (as w i t h  Utterbach's) as an industry ages, so the underlying nature 
of techno1 ogy changes from mainly new product development to  mainly process change : 
a t  the same time t he  substitutfon of capftal fo r  labour increase progressively 
until  the industry reaches a c r i s i s  stage when a1 1 typesof Investment generally 
decrease. (According t o  Maier and Haustein i t  might be possible to  avoid decline 
i n  the saturation stage, which resul ts  i n  c r i s i s  ,if the industry adopts a vigorous 
policy of innovation, t o  regenerate demand i n  existing rarkets ,  as well as a policy 
of diversif icatlon into new market areas).  The process of capital/labour rubstftution 
i s  thus closely associated w i t h  the underlying nature of innovation. 
fMensch (1977) has analysed 342 major innovations i n  W.G. industry between 1952 
and 1973, that were identified by an NSF Science Indicators Project. He showed 
that the ra t io  of 'expansionary' innovations to 'rational i sation' innova tions 
changed from 53% for  the period 1952-1959 to 28% for  the period 1960-1973. 








